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Introduction
1 Democracy and Education was an ambitious project. Dewey stated in both 1916 and 1930
that it was the most comprehensive statement of his philosophy,1 but the work achieved
something  even  greater:  it  put  Dewey’s  name  alongside the  greatest  Western
philosophers  who  addressed  education.  Indeed,  when  Democracy  and  Education  was
published in 1916, it  was hailed as the greatest work of educational philosophy since
Rousseau’s Emile (Cremin 1964: 120). By 1916, Dewey had already secured an international
reputation as the greatest educational philosopher of his day. Thus his readers may have
been inclined to receive his most comprehensive work on the philosophy of education as
a landmark work on the topic. Perhaps his early readers drew this conclusion because at
the heart  of  Democracy  and Education is  a  chapter  on “The Democratic  Conception of
Education”  in  which  Dewey  presented  a  positive  statement  of  the  relationship  of
democracy and education followed by a critique of Plato, Rousseau, and Fichte and Hegel.
Dewey seemed to invite his readers to reflect on how his arguments stand next to theirs.
2 Did  Dewey  simply  believe  that  critiquing  historical  philosophical  conceptions  of
education would best  help clarify his  own account? Or might Dewey have had other
motivations as well? Consideration of these questions,  I  argue, suggests an answer to
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another question, one that has persisted since the Dewey began writing on education:
Why was Dewey so frequently misread? The answer to the former question is only partly
that  Dewey  thought  that  there  was  value  in  tackling  entrenched  and  influential
educational ideas, and that doing so helped elucidate his own views. I argue that Dewey’s
discussion of educational aims was designed not only to critique Plato and Rousseau, but
also  primarily,  subtly,  and  by  analogy,  to  critique  his  American  contemporaries  via
historical European philosophers. Recognizing Dewey’s reticence to criticize his American
contemporaries by name ought to be more seriously considered in the voluminous debate
about  Dewey’s  legacy.  Before  turning  to  that  argument,  however,  I  turn  to  Dewey’s
employment of the history of educational philosophy in his works.
 
1. Dewey and the History of Educational Philosophy
3 One hundred years  after  placing his  educational  aims alongside  Plato,  Rousseau and
others in Democracy and Education, Dewey’s analysis reads not as ambitious overreaching
but as appropriate and fitting – Democracy and Education incontestably stands among the
most important works of the history of educational thought. Yet Dewey did not regularly
engage  deeply  the  philosophers  of  the  past  in  his  educational  writings.  Unlike,  say,
Nietzsche,  Heidegger,  and  Derrida,  whose  works  engage  a  historical  conversation
routinely and substantively, Dewey’s educational works are only occasionally peppered
with analysis and comparison of historical ideas and concepts.
4 Nevertheless, Dewey repeatedly made the case for the value of history in contemporary
educational theory and practice. Dewey not only read widely in the history of education
and educational philosophy, he also saw the benefit of students doing so. For example,
Dewey assembled a syllabus for a “History of Education” correspondence course through
Columbia University’s School of Liberal Arts and Sciences. On the syllabus, Dewey wrote
that “teachers, parents and others interested in correct educational theory and practice”
need to recognize that “no teacher can do the best possible with the present conditions
and tendencies without knowing something of how they came to be” (LW 17: 160).2 The
range of topics and readings in the syllabus are remarkably broad; the course covers, for
example, Greek, Chinese, Roman, early Christian, Medieval, and Renaissance education, in
addition to more recent history. On the Greeks alone the students were instructed to read
not only selections from Plato and Aristotle but also selections from Protagoras, Isocrates,
Aristophanes, Thucydides, and Homer. He directed students to historical scholarship on
the sophists, but Dewey warns them that the authors he assigned to them (Paul Monroe
and Thomas Davidson) exaggerate the individualistic nature of the sophists’ work (LW 17:
183-4).3 Dewey’s detailed syllabus (of which only the first four of twenty-four sections are
extant) basically amounts to its own textbook; it  is evidence of the depth of Dewey’s
awareness of and engagement with not only historical educational philosophy but also
contemporary scholarship on the subject.
5 Yet Dewey’s educational publications, despite occasional references to historical figures,
do not generally explore historical philosophers’ ideas at length.4 Dewey did not need to
turn to history to find a wide variety of competing articulations of educational aims. He
found  himself  in  a  particularly  rich  environment  in  the  late  nineteenth  and  early
twentieth centuries in that regard: Dewey and his contemporaries were deeply immersed
in debates about the purpose of schooling in America. It was a time in American history
when more and more children were attending schools, and attending them for longer.
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The subsequent growth of schools led to much debate about what those schools ought to
accomplish; should they prepare graduates for work, for college, or for “life”? Should
they cultivate discipline, or develop students’ interests? The list could go on – the chapter
headings of Democracy and Education capture the wealth of educational aims debated while
Dewey was writing. And, yet, at the key moment of argument in Democracy and Education
is a critique of some of the giants of the western canon rather than his contemporaries.
Why  does  Dewey  turn  to  historical  philosophers  instead  of  his  contemporaries’
arguments?
 
2. Plato, Rousseau, Fichte and Hegel in Democracy and
Education
6 In chapter seven, arguably the heart of Democracy and Education, Dewey made the case that
“democracy is more than a form of government; it  is primarily a mode of associated
living, of conjoint communicated experience,” and provided two standards for evaluating
the quality of social life: “the extent in which the interests of a group are shared by all its
members, and the fullness and freedom with which it interacts with other groups” (MW 9:
105). His conception of the relationship of democracy and education is presented in the
first two sections of chapter seven (7.1 and 7.2).  In a somewhat abrupt transition, he
wrote, 
subsequent chapters  will  be  devoted  to  making  explicit  the  implications  of  the
democratic ideas in education. In the remaining portions of this chapter, we shall
consider the educational theories which have been evolved in three epochs when
the social import of education was especially conspicuous. (MW 9: 94)5 
7 7.3 focuses on Plato, 7.4 on Rousseau (primarily, at least, as the most prominent figure of
“The ‘Individualistic’ Ideal of the Eighteenth Century”) and 7.5 on Fichte and Hegel (as
representatives of “Education as National and as Social”).
8 Dewey wrote that Plato’s educational philosophy is “in bondage to static ideals […] the
final end of life is fixed” (MW 9: 97). Further, Plato “limited his view to a ‘general and
ultimate’ aim,” which Dewey warned, is something that “educators have to be on their
guard against” (MW 9:  116).  Dewey’s  critique,  on the one hand,  makes sense.  Plato’s
Socrates does indeed discuss the value of understanding the ultimate aim of education –
establishing  a  just  community  under  the  wise  leadership.  And  Plato’s  Socrates  does
indeed propose a society with three fixed classes. Yet there is something unsatisfactory in
Dewey’s analysis. Plato’s Republic is not the only place one could find a society that is “in
bondage to static ideals” nor is it necessarily the best example of that. Dewey knew well
of class-based societies of the past and in 1916. Was Plato really the best source for this
critique? Dewey ignores most of the innovations that Plato’s Socrates describes that have
become influential in educational philosophy and are of continued influence in higher
education. There is no discussion of the broad liberal arts curriculum of The Republic’s 
Book VII (521d-34e).  He offers no discussion on the importance of gender equality in
education, or the lasting effects on character of stories, music, and poetry. Perhaps most
surprisingly  given Dewey’s  task at  hand,  he neglects  to  address  Socrates’  critique of
democracy  in  Book  VIII  (555b-566b).  Dewey  has  not  necessarily  mischaracterized
Socrates’ argument, but the reader begins to wonder why Dewey would turn to Plato at
such a critical point of Democracy and Education if his treatment of Plato is so partial.
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9 I  shall  discuss Dewey’s analysis  of  Rousseau,  Fichte,  and Hegel  below,  but for now it
suffices  to  say  that  Dewey’s  engagement  with  their  ideas  in  Chapter 7 is  also
conspicuously limited. Indeed, among the copious scholarship on Democracy and Education
since its  publication one hundred years  ago, very little  scholarship has  appeared on
Dewey’s treatment therein of Plato, Rousseau, Hegel, and Fichte. And this is fitting, since,
as I’ll argue, his engagement serves another purpose. So why did he address them at all,
let alone put them at the very core of his book? 
10 One obvious and incontestably valid reason is that Dewey believed that through critique
of the ideas of others, he could more clearly articulate his own educational philosophy.
Using Plato, Rousseau, and others to test out his two standards of democratic education is
clearly  central  to  Dewey’s  use  of  them.  But  since  he  spends  most  of  Democracy  and
Education applying these standards in great depth to contemporary concerns, and does so
quite successfully, the value of these historical philosophers in the book is questionable.
11 Another explanation might be that Dewey intended to place himself alongside Plato and
Rousseau as one of the greatest educational philosophers in history. By 1916, Dewey was
already hailed internationally as the leading educational theorist of his generation, so
maybe he believed there to be value in distinguishing his own views from the other giants
of educational thought. Dewey may have wanted to juxtapose his argument with theirs to
illuminate  the  new,  paradigm  challenging  directions  he  sought  to  take  educational
philosophy and society more generally.
12 As should be clear from my discussion of Dewey’s history course, I do not believe that
Dewey was either poorly informed about the history of educational philosophy, nor that
he  was  uninterested  in  it.  To  the  contrary,  Dewey’s  “History  of  Education”  syllabus
suggests that he was eminently capable of  providing a more robust critique of those
historical philosophers should he have elected to do so. There is something else at play in
chapter  seven:  Dewey  used  these  historical  accounts  to  critique  his  contemporaries’
educational theories and practices.
13 In the two decades preceding the publication of Democracy and Education, and during the
period that he was writing it, Dewey was immersed in thinking about and popularizing
child-centered,  progressive,  experimental  schools.  Dewey’s  followers and critics  often
associated him with child-centered, pedagogical progressives, but this was an association
he often resisted.
14 Dewey’s criticism of Rousseau in Democracy and Education is targeted not only at Rousseau,
and, I  argue, not primarily at Rousseau. In chapter nine,  Dewey explicitly wrote that
nature  as  aim  is  “of  recent  influence”  (MW  9:  118),  appealing  to  the  “educational
reformers disgusted with the conventionality and artificiality of the scholastic methods,”
but that “since no one has stated in the doctrine both its truth and falsity better than
Rousseau,  we shall  turn to  him” (MW 9:  119).  Dewey had long been warning of  the
excesses of child-centered, pedagogical progressivism.6 Democracy and Education was no
exception as Dewey reiterated that, for example, the “idealizing of childhood” was in
effect  “nothing  but  lazy  indulgence”  (MW  9:  56).  Dewey’s  criticism  of  pedagogical
progressivism was not of merely theoretical problems that a progressive school might
encounter; by 1916, in addition to the experiences with the progressive Colonel Francis
Parker’s school (which Dewey’s children had attended: see Westbrook 1991: 96) and his
own Laboratory School, Dewey was well aware of the pitfalls of the “new” education, and
his knowledge of these schools informed his analysis in Democracy and Education.
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15 In Schools of To-Morrow, published in 1915, Dewey provided an account of several schools
that endorsed Rousseauean ideals, ideals about which he would point out many flaws in
Democracy and Education. Dewey and his daughter and co-author wrote that, of the various
schools  they  described,  “most  of  these  points  of  similarity  are  found  in  the  views
advocated  by  Rousseau”  (MW  8:  389).  For  example,  of  Mrs. Johnson  at  Fairhope,  in
Alabama,  they noted that  “her main underlying principle is  Rousseau’s  central  idea”
about the nature of childhood (MW 8: 222). Dewey did not criticize these individuals or
schools directly though, despite the fact that the schools are, in many ways, examples of
the “new” education that he consistently described as extreme in My Pedagogic Creed, The
Child and the Curriculum, and in other educational writings. Only Rousseau and, to a much
lesser extent, the Italian educational theorist Maria Montessori are targets of any direct
criticism in the Schools of To-Morrow.7
16 Rousseau stands in for the sorts of schools and teachers he described in Schools of To-
Morrow. In Democracy and Education, Dewey criticized Rousseau because “merely to leave
everything to nature was, after all, but to negate the very idea of education” (MW 9: 99).8
Such  a  clear,  harsh  attack  is  never  leveled  at  Dewey’s  American  contemporary
pedagogical progressives by name, though “leaving things to nature” was very much an
orienting ideal of the progressive schools that were being conceived of or opening in that
period.9 Only in the conclusion of Schools of To-Morrow does Dewey note, in what might be
read as a rebuke of the schools described, that “mere activity, if not directed toward some
end, may result in developing muscular strength, but it can have very little effect on the
mental development of the pupils” (MW 8: 391). Is the conclusion referring to schools
reported on in the book, or to other schools which fall short of the examples reported on
in the book? The reader is left to speculate about whether the schools described in Schools
of To-Morrow somehow met the ideals of democratic schools that Dewey described in the
conclusion.10 Nor in all of the reporting of the schools in Schools of To-Morrow, in which the
joy, cheerfulness, and happiness of the children is a frequent theme,11 does Dewey raise a
concern that the emphasis on the individual might result in neglecting the social aspect
of education. The criticism falls on Rousseau alone, and the “sentimental egotism” of his
educational philosophy (MW 8: 249). 
17 Maybe  Dewey  considered  the  American  educators  featured  in  Schools  of  To-Morrow –
unlike Montessori and Rousseau – too minor or too close to him to warrant rebuke from
him; Dewey would have been well aware that his opinion on all matters educational was
taken  very  seriously  by  the  1910s,  and  may  therefore  have  been  reluctant  to  judge
harshly  the  educational  pioneers  he  featured.  But  to  better  understand  Dewey’s
reluctance to criticize pedagogical progressives, we might consider the case of William
Heard Kilpatrick, who was arguably the most influential pedagogical progressive. Two
years after the publication of Democracy and Education, Kilpatrick (1918) published “The
Project Method,” instantly launching him to the forefront of the charge to implement the
“new” education in schools.
18 In the view of many scholars, Dewey labored tirelessly to distinguish himself from child-
centered progressives. Westbrook, for example, writes that Dewey “took every available
opportunity”  (Westbrook 1991:  502)  to  challenge them,  and that  he  was  “anxious  to
distinguish  his  thinking  from  that  of  other  reformers  with  whom  he  profoundly
disagreed” (Ibid.: 501). Westbrook names Kilpatrick as “one of [Dewey’s] principal targets”
(Ibid.: 504). Yet the direct references to Kilpatrick in Dewey’s Collected Works tend to be
positive.  Though  scholars  point  to  essays  like  “The  Way  Out  of  Our  Educational
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Confusion”  (LW 6:  75-89)  as  a  direct  attack  on  the  project  method,  the  work  never
mentions  Kilpatrick  by  name.  And  Dewey’s  criticism in  that  essay  could  be  read  as
directed not at the project method in principle, but rather at the way that the project
method was implemented in some elementary schools. One searching Dewey’s Collected
Works for explicit, sustained critical engagement with Kilpatrick’s ideas would find only
the appreciative foreword Dewey penned for Kilpatrick’s biography in 1952 (LW 17: 52-6).
19 In  Democracy  and  Education,  readers  encounter  similar  reluctance.  Dewey  challenged
Rousseau  because  it  enabled  him  to  air,  once  again,  his  criticism  of  pedagogical
progressivism.  The  effectiveness  of  Dewey’s  indirect  criticism  of  pedagogical
progressivism is something to which I shall return in the next section. First, we might
recognize  that  Dewey’s  approach  was  similar  when  addressing  the  social  efficiency
progressives.
20 In his critique of German nationalistic ideals in 7.5, Dewey explicitly noted that social
efficiency was emphasized as an aim of nationalistic education; in Germany, 
the school system […] supplied the patriotic citizen and soldier and the future state
official  and administrator  and furnished the  means  for  military,  industrial,  and
political defense and expansion, it was impossible for theory not to emphasize the
aim of social efficiency. (MW 9: 100; emphasis added)
21 Dewey’s discussion of nineteenth century political and social aims in chapter seven (a line
of argument he continued in chapter nine), allowed him to critique the administrative,
social efficiency progressives indirectly.12
22 The  social  and  national  aims  attributed  to  Fichte  and  Hegel  in  7.5  diverged  in  two
important ways among Dewey’s contemporaries. On the one hand, some maintained the
Hegelian framework for viewing individuals as needing to be civilized, in a sense, and
brought into a national culture. The educational expression of this Hegelian view was the
much debated (and much scorned by progressives) Committee of Ten Report of 1893 and
the Committee of Fifteen Report of 1895. Charles W. Eliot and William Torrey Harris made
an unapologetic case for a broad, liberal arts curriculum for all (rejecting the progressive
calls for curricular differentiation). Dewey suggested in his analysis of national and social
aims, as well as his discussion of culture as aim (in chapter nine, section three), that a
rigid, common, liberal arts curriculum is yet another way that an individual student’s
interests are subordinated to an external end, in this case to initiate the student into
culture.
23 On the other hand, social efficiency progressives like David Snedden argued that schools
should prepare students for their civic, economic roles in the state. Social efficiency, in
Dewey’s  analysis,  subordinated  the  student  to  a  civic  goal.  Dewey  criticized  social
efficiency progressives for articulating a vision of education that would only perpetuate
the status quo, even exacerbating social stratification in which different schools prepared
students for a life similar to that of their parents’ community: 
It is the aim of progressive education to take part in correcting unfair privilege and
unfair deprivation, not to perpetuate them […] there is a danger that industrial
education will be dominated by acceptance of the status quo. (MW 9: 126)
24 Dewey wrote an essay criticizing vocational  education in The New Republic  in 1914 to
which David Snedden responded. Dewey’s rejoinder was published along with Snedden’s
critique in  1915 in  the  same magazine.  In  both essays,  Dewey wrote  that  industrial,
vocational education accepts the current class divisions and perpetuates them. In 1914 he
wrote, 
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every ground of public policy protests against any use of the public school system
which takes for granted the perpetuity of the existing industrial regime, and whose
inevitable  effect  is  to  perpetuate  it,  with  all  its  antagonism  of  employer  and
employed, producer and consumer.13
25 In 1915, he wrote, 
I  am utterly  opposed to giving the power of  social  predestination,  by means of
narrow trade-training, to any group of fallible men no matter how well-intentioned
they may be. (MW 8: 411)14 
26 In Democracy and Education, rather than targeting David Snedden directly for his efforts to
determine  students’  aptitudes  and,  consequently,  their  civic  and economic  potential,
Dewey  wrote  broadly  of  the  problem  of  subordinating  the  individual  to  the  state.
Snedden’s name appears nowhere in Democracy and Education, not even when Dewey turns
again to the topic of social efficiency in chapter nine, nor when he explicitly addresses
vocational aspects of education in chapter twenty-three.
27 Just as section 7.5 offers a subtle critique of two of Dewey’s contemporaries’ schools of
thought, so too does the critique of Plato in 7.3. One might expect that Dewey would have
been likely  to  criticize  advocates  of  traditional  education more  directly.  But  despite
Dewey’s consistent, trenchant critiques of traditional education, he rarely targets specific
individuals who promote or practice such pedagogy.15 In Plato, Dewey finds another stand
in  because,  just  as  in  the  “old  education,”  static  knowledge  serves  as  an  end,  and
inflexibility  and  resistance  to  change  are  underlying  principles  (MW  9:  94  and  97).
Additionally, perhaps the critique of Plato targets advocates of “culture as aim” such as
William Torrey Harris, who thought that they could help the nation’s youth escape from
the  cave,  joining  the  ranks  of  the  enlightened.  Like  Plato,  Harris  proposed  a  rigid,
“academic” curriculum. At the same time, Dewey’s concerns about class stratification
targeted the social efficiency progressives because of the way their educational vision was
centered on preparing students for particular kinds of employment, as I described above.
In  his  discussion  of  vocational  education  in  chapter  twenty  three,  Dewey  explicitly
invoked Plato and described his most significant error as his “limited conception of the
scope of vocations socially needed” (MW 9: 319).
28 Dewey’s  approach to  the historical  philosophers’  ideas  in  chapter  seven reveals  that
Dewey was not primarily concerned with illuminating the logic and nuances of those
philosophers’ arguments. Rather, Dewey highlighted in his analysis only the ideas that
were influential, advocated, or debated among his contemporaries. And this treatment of
historical  philosophers  is  consistent  with  Dewey’s  general  ideas  about  the  value  of
history. “History,” Dewey wrote, “deals with the past, but this past is the history of the
present” (MW 9: 222).16 Indeed, Dewey’s discussion of Plato, Rousseau, and the German
Idealists ought to be read primarily as an engagement with the present – a vehicle to
advance criticism of his contemporaries.
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Plato
Traditional  education  and  “culture  as  aim”  advocates  who  sought  a  fixed
curriculum and “static ideals” (e.g. William Torrey Harris)
Social efficiency progressives who sought to determine children’s potential and
provide an education tailored to that potential (e.g., David Snedden)
Rousseau




Social  efficiency  progressives  who  subordinated  the  individual  to  serve  the
state’s industrial régime (e.g. David Snedden)
Hegelian  defenders  of  traditional  education who believed the state’s  role  is  to
civilize citizens, initiating them into national culture (e.g. William Torrey Harris)
 
3. Dewey’s Legacy
29 It is by now a commonplace among Dewey scholars that Dewey’s name was often invoked
to support ideas and practices that were dramatically opposed to his intent. Scholars have
proposed a variety of theories to explain this state of affairs. Some have argued that, early
in his career, he advocated child-centered progressivism, and only later became its critic
(most prominently in Experience and Education).17 But such an explanation is not supported
by Dewey’s works, since, from his earliest works, he warned against excessive indulgence
of children’s interests,  and a variety of other beliefs and practices that characterized
pedagogical progressivism.18 Another theory suggests that it was Dewey’s disciples who
molded  Deweyan  theory  into  practice,  and  Dewey’s  lofty,  complex  ideas  were  often
simplified  into  practices  that  emphasized  the  “new”  education,  while  failing  to
incorporate what Dewey argued was valuable about the “old” education. William Heard
Kilpatrick is frequently identified as the culprit, and has been at least since the 1950s.19
Sometimes the argument of disciples’ influence is proposed alongside an argument that
Dewey was unclear about the practicalities of his theory or that he was difficult to read.20
Another explanation is that the middle road that Dewey sought to construct between the
traditional and new curriculum led to his irrelevance to each side; Dewey’s criticism of
the traditional curriculum was too radical for most American educators to follow, and his
failure  to  go  as  far  as  the  pedagogical  progressives  failed  to  garner  their  support
(Westbrook 1991: 508).
30 Other  than  the  theory  that  Dewey  changed  course  in  his  career,  all  of  the  other
explanations for Dewey’s legacy have merit. But one ought to consider whether Dewey’s
ideas would have been better understood if he had been willing to challenge the ideas of
others more directly. Readers of Schools of To-Morrow and Democracy and Education can
point  to  precise  critiques  of  Montessori  that  not  only  better  illuminate  Montessori’s
theory, but also Dewey’s.21 Had he been willing to subject his fellow Americans to similar
direct criticism, Dewey’s arguments would have been clearer,  and Dewey would have
been less easily mistaken for endorsing positions that he would have rejected. Among the
clearest of Dewey’s many discussions of vocational education, for example, is the essay he
was invited to write to respond to Snedden’s critique of him – in which, it is worth noting,
Snedden read Dewey as “giving aid and comfort to the opponents of a broader, richer and
more effective program of education” (Snedden 1915). Outside of a handful of responses
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similar  to  the  one he penned to  Snedden,  or  occasional  book reviews,  Dewey rarely
criticized either his fellow progressives or his critics by name in his educational writings.
22 The overall effect was to enable many of his readers to project views onto Dewey that
Dewey would not  have endorsed.  Furthermore,  it  made it  more difficult  for  Dewey’s
readers  to  grasp  his  precise  challenge  to  the  traditional  education,  social  efficiency
progressivism, pedagogical progressivism, and, later, social reconstructionism.
31 Why might Dewey have been so reluctant to criticize others? Dewey’s work is animated
by a deep respect for those teachers and researchers who were devoting their time and
energy to pedagogy and educational reform. Perhaps the explanation is too facile, but
Dewey may have hesitated to criticize the work of his fellow American pioneers who
shared  with  him  a  commitment  that  education  is  central  to  the  flourishing  of  a
democratic society and democratic citizens. Dewey seems to have preferred to explore
the ideas themselves of America’s educational reformers, scholars, and teachers, rather
than tarnish reputations. To put this in the most favorable light, Dewey’s fellow educators
and education scholars were treated with the generosity of spirit that Dewey believed
ought to animate disagreements in the best kind of society.
32 Democracy and Education provides us with a prominent example of Dewey critiquing his
contemporaries subtly and by analogy. By turning to Plato, Rousseau, Fichte and Hegel in
chapter  seven,  Dewey’s  readers  of  the  past  one  hundred  years  may  have  failed  to
appreciate  how deeply  his  argument  is  rooted  in  the  ideas  and  debates  of  his  own
lifetime. Yet Dewey’s indirect approach also accounts for the creation of a work that
genuinely warrants being called a classic – it rises above the educational debates of the
early twentieth century to enter into a conversation with its  educational  ancestry,  a
conversation that  Dewey propelled forward,  giving Democracy  and Education  an air  of
timelessness.
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NOTES
1. In a 1916 letter he wrote “[t]he Democracy and Education in spite of its title is the closest
attempt I have made to sum up my entire philosophical position.” In 1930 he wrote that it was
“for many years [the book] in which my philosophy, such as it is, was most fully expounded.”
Both letters  are cited in MW 9:  377.  References to John Dewey’s  published works are to the
critical edition, The Collected Works of John Dewey, 1882-1953, edited by Boydston J. A., Carbondale
and Edwardsville, Southern Illinois University Press, 1967-1991, and published in three series as
The Early Works 1882-1899 [EW], The Middle Works 1899-1924 [MW], and The Later Works 1925-1953
[LW].
2. Dewey  was  consistent  in  his  remarks  about  the  value  of  history,  at  least, if  history  is
understood in a certain way (a topic to which I return below). For another example of Dewey
attesting to the value of history, see MW 1: 104-9. 
3. On the depth of Dewey’s engagement with the Greeks in particular, see Kirby 2014.
4. In contrast,  throughout his philosophical  works on subjects other than education,  readers
encounter frequent discursions on Aristotle, Plato, Hume, Kant, and so forth. Consider the case of
Aristotle, for example. The index to Dewey’s Collected Works contains 160 lines of references to
Aristotle.  Yet only two of the 160 lines of entries refer specifically to Aristotle on education,
referring  readers  to  three  works,  two  of  them  encyclopedia  entries  (in  MW 7  and  MW 13,
respectively).  The  other  reference  is  to  Democracy  and  Education  in  the  “Labor  and  Leisure”
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chapter.  There are a few other references to Aristotle on education that appear under more
specific  Aristotle  index  items  –  in  Democracy  and  Education,  for  example, Aristotle  is  also
mentioned in the “Intellectual and Practical Studies,” the “Physical and Social studies” and the
“Theory of Morals” chapters. Nevertheless, these references add at most a few more lines to the
two others on education, and remain a very slim proportion of the 160 lines of entries overall in
Dewey’s  Collected  Works.  Given  how  often  Dewey  discussed  Aristotle  in  his  non-educational
philosophical writings, the contrast is striking. See Dewey (1991: 116-8).
5. Part of the unnaturalness in the transition in the argument may have been due to the fact that
the book was originally contracted as a textbook. Indeed the initial contract assigned the title of
“Text-book on the Philosophy of Education” (MW 9: 377-8). 
6. In  My  Pedagogic  Creed,  he  wrote  that  a  student’s  interest  is  not  to  be  “repressed,”  but,
pointedly, it must not be “humored” either (EW 5: 92-3). In “Interest in Relation to training of the
Will,” published in 1896, he wrote that “[t]he spoiled child who does only what he likes is the
inevitable outcome of the theory of interest in education” (EW 5: 116). In 1902, in The Child and the
Curriculum, Dewey rejected the “sentimental idealizations” of the child (MW 2: 279). In Interest
and Effort in Education published in 1913 his tone is similar (MW 7: 154-5). This is not to say that
Dewey did not continuously refine his position. He certainly did so. See, for example, his evolving
treatment of interest in Jonas (2011: 124-6). 
7. The criticism of Montessori schools was minimal,  but the fact that the Montessori schools
received any criticism at all, given the treatment of the other schools in the book, is noteworthy.
The  Deweys  praise  Montessori  schools  because  the  student  “is  confronted  with  an obvious
problem, which is solved by his own handling of the material. The child is educating himself in
that  he  sees  his  own mistakes  and corrects  them,  and the finished  result  is  perfect;  partial
success or failure is not possible.” But the Deweys argued that Montessori students are not free
intellectually because they lack the freedom to create (MW 8: 307, 309). Notably, Montessori is
also criticized in Democracy and Education (MW 9: 160 and 205). One can only speculate about why
Dewey was willing to criticize Montessori by name. Perhaps it was because her schools were so
well established in Italy that he did not fear for her reputation. As the schools were growing in
popularity  beyond  Italy,  maybe  Dewey  thought  that  American  progressive  educators  might
correct  some  of  the  problematic  aspects  of  them.  Or  perhaps  Dewey  was  contributing  to  a
scholarly  discussion  taking  place  among  his  colleagues  at  Teachers  College.  William  Heard
Kilpatrick had travelled to Italy during the time Dewey was writing Schools  of  To-Morrow and 
Democracy  and  Education  and had reported on Montessori’s  educational  theory and influence. 
Kilpatrick  published  The  Montessori  System  Examined  in  1914  and  acknowledged  Dewey’s
suggestions on his draft version of the book. See Beineke (1998: 71).
8. Dewey was not beyond character attacks on Rousseau. In the opening of chapter four of Schools
of To-Morrow, Dewey pointed out to readers that Rousseau had abandoned his children to the
foundling system (MW 8: 248).
9. By the 1920s, many schools would be caricatured for their laissez-faire approach, including that
of Lucy Sprague Mitchell, with whom Dewey was a close associate. Cremin describes places like
Caroline Pratt’s Play School (opened in 1913 and which Lucy Sprague Mitchell began supporting
and working in by 1916) as follows: “In too many classrooms license began to pass for liberty,
planlessness for spontaneity, recalcitrance for individuality, obfuscation for art, and chaos for
education  –  all  justified  in  the  rhetoric  of  expressionism” (Cremin  1964:  207).  Lucy  Sprague
Mitchell,  like  other pedagogical  progressives,  is  never the direct  target  of  Dewey’s  criticism,
despite the fact that, in many ways, her school was an extreme example of the “new” education.
On Sprague and Dewey’s relationship, see Antler (1987: ch. 11). 
10. After its publication, he was quick to deny that the schools described in Schools of To-Morrow
were “Dewey” schools, inspired by his work. Rather, he wrote in an open letter addressed to
William Bagley, “much of the significance of the various experiments lies in the fact that they
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have sprung up independently under diverse auspices” (MW 8: 414). Further, Dewey seems to
have conceived of the book as a purely journalistic work, a work in which, perhaps, his criticism
was not appropriate (MW 8: 388). On this point, see Kliebard (2002: 94-6). But Dewey’s reluctance
to criticize directly progressive experimental schools and educators in Schools of To-Morrow, as I
shall show, is a general feature of his treatment of pedagogical progressives, and not limited to
that work. Further, he did indeed offer some generalized criticism of the new education in the
conclusion of the work, and via Rousseau, as I describe below.
11. For example: “They are uniformly happy in school, and enthusiastically proclaim their ‘love’
for it. Not only is the work interesting to the group as a whole, but no individual child is forced to
a task that does not appeal; each pupil may do as he pleases as long as he does not interfere with
anyone else” (MW 8: 226).
12. I  speak broadly about social  efficiency progressivism, though it  is  an “amorphous,  if  not
ambiguous” category (Fallace & Fantozzi 2013: 145). 
13. Dewey noted that the defenders of vocational education often cited Germany as a model.
Dewey warned that Germany’s purpose was “frankly nationalistic […] the wellbeing of the state
as a moral entity is supreme. The promotion of commerce against international competitors is
one of the chief means of fostering the state” (MW 7: 94-5).
14. Dewey also  wrote  in  that  article  that  “[t]he  kind of  vocational  education in  which I  am
interested  is  not  one  which  will  ‘adapt’  workers  to  the  existing  industrial  regime;  I  am not
sufficiently in love with the regime for that. It seems to me that the business of all who would not
be educational timeservers is to resist every move in this direction, and to strive for a kind of
vocational  education  which  will  first  alter  the  existing  industrial  system,  and  ultimately
transform it” (MW 8: 412). In Democracy and Education he warned similarly of the danger of social
predestination: “Any scheme for vocational education which takes its point of departure from
the industrial regime that now exists;  is likely to assume and to perpetuate its divisions and
weaknesses,  and thus to  become an instrument in accomplishing the feudal  dogma of  social
predestination” (MW 9:  328).  See also his similar comments years later in LW 3:  262.  On the
debate with Snedden, see Labaree 2011.
15. Two decades after writing Democracy and Education, Dewey would pen two essays in The Social
Frontier critiquing Robert Hutchins’s The Higher Learning in America “Rationality in Education”
(1936) and “President Hutchins’ Proposals to Remake Higher Education” (1937). Despite all the
attention to Dewey’s direct challenge to Hutchins, those essays total only eleven pages in the
Collected Works (LW 11: 397-407). The Collected Works Index lists only two other essays in which
Hutchins is mentioned explicitly: “The Democratic Faith and Education” (1944) and “Challenge to
Liberal Thought” (1944) in LW 15: 251-75. This is not to say that Dewey does not take up the
debate  with  Hutchins  elsewhere.  It  is  merely  to  say  that  elsewhere  he  took  up  the  debate
indirectly,  akin  to  his  approach  in  Democracy  and  Education.  At  least  Dewey’s  challenge  to
Hutchins, unlike his treatment of Kilpatrick, helped his readers understand the precise nature of
their disagreement (though Dewey’s argument is typically complex); see Johnston 2011. 
16. Likewise he wrote: “A knowledge of the past and its heritage is of great significance when it
enters into the present, but not otherwise” (MW 9: 81). On the nature of Dewey’s engagement
with the present in Democracy and Education in the context of the First World War, see Waks 2007.
17. Cremin offers a nuanced version of this position: “[A]s the twenties progressed, he became
less the interpreter and synthesizer of the progressive education movement, and increasingly its
critic” (Cremin 1964: 234). 
18. In addition to my above discussion of the critique of Rousseau, see note 6.
19. See  Kandel  1958.  See  also  Null  2007.  Another  related  but  distinct  claim  is  that  Dewey’s
pragmatic  progressivism  in  education  arose  only  after  Rousseauean  romantic  progressive
education had become well-entrenched.  The romantic  progressives  adopted some of  Dewey’s
critique of traditional education, but were never heavily influenced by Dewey. See Burnett 1979. 
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20. E.g. Cremin (1964: 238-9). H. L. Mencken wrote that Dewey “is the worst writer ever heard of
in America, and probably the worst philosopher known to history” cited in Westbrook (1991:
501).
21. See note 7.
22. On the Robert Hutchins exception, see note 15.
ABSTRACTS
In Democracy and Education, in the midst of the pivotal chapter on “The Democratic Conception in
Education,” Dewey juxtaposes his  educational  aims with those of  Plato,  Rousseau,  Fichte and
Hegel. Perhaps Dewey believed that an account of their views would help elucidate his own, or he
intended to suggest that his own ideas rivaled or bested theirs. I argue that Dewey’s discussion of
historical  philosophers’  aims  of  education  was  also  designed  to  critique  his  contemporaries
subtly and by analogy. My analysis of Dewey’s critique supports a second argument: one of the
reasons  Dewey’s  legacy  has  been  long  debated  (particularly  his  relationship  to  pedagogical
progressivism) derives from his reluctance to criticize his contemporaries explicitly and directly.
Had  Dewey  critiqued  his  fellow  American  progressives  in  the  same  way  he  did  historical
European philosophers of the past, his readers would have better understood his relationship to
progressive American educational ideas and practices. Yet Dewey’s subtle approach also accounts
for the creation of a work that genuinely warrants being called a classic – it  rises above the
educational  debates  of  the  early  twentieth  century  to  enter  into  a  conversation  with  its
educational ancestry, a conversation that Dewey propelled forward. 
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